Wednesday, 19 February 2014


amanfromMars posted to the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto … Tue 18 Feb 20:59 [1402182059] this comment in reference to the tales told on
Before a government can receive data, it must first infect one or more target devices with the RCS spyware. Frequently, this takes the form of phishing attacks that convince a user to open a cleverly-disguised executable file, or authorize installation of an application. However, the use of exploits, which take advantage of bugs in computer software, can be a more effective technique. Exploits typically require less user interaction before a successful infection (e.g. opening a Microsoft Word document or simply viewing a webpage is enough).  …. Bill Marczak, Claudio Guarnieri, Morgan Marquis-Boire, and John Scott-Railton.
Hi, Bill Marczak, Claudio Guarnieri, Morgan Marquis-Boire, and John Scott-Railton,
This webpage would be a prime candidate for such attempted exploitation and infection of any communicating computer and virtual machine network. Hiding in full plain text sight in the guise of an informant outing the “enemy” is quite effective enough for flash fools and blunt tools engaged with dumb silent foe who will never ever be smarter adversary, but that is just as far as such stealthy intrusion into smarter contemporary security systems will get.
For further travel into and exciting exhilarating enjoyment of alien fields of foreign exploitation, with remote anonymous command and absolute virtual control of information and intelligence, is a quantum communications leap required for leading state and non-state actor players such that the following solution and conjecture is delivered and enjoyed by future builders ……
We consider problems where n people are communicating and a random subset of them is trying to leak information, without making it clear who are leaking the information. We introduce a measure of suspicion, and show that the amount of leaked information will always be bounded by the expected increase in suspicion, and that this bound is tight. We ask the question: Suppose a large number of people have some information they want to leak, but they want to ensure that after the communication, an observer will assign probability ≤ c to the events that each of them is trying to leak the information. How much information can they reliably leak, per person who is leaking? We show that the answer is … [Please see the paper …”Information Theoretical Cryptogenography” by Sune K Jakobsen, from which this Abstract and Introduction are taken]
The year is 2084 and the world is controlled by a supercomputer called Eve. It makes the laws, carries them out, has surveillance cameras everywhere, can hear everything you say, and can break any kind of cryptography. It was designed to make a world that maximises the total amount of happiness, while still being fair. However, Eve started to make some unfortunate decisions. For example, it thought that to maximise the utility it has been designed to maximise, it must ensure that it survives, so it decided to execute everyone it knew beyond reasonable doubt was trying to plot against Eve (it was designed so it could not punish anyone as long as there is reasonable doubt, and reasonable doubt had been defined to be a 5% chance of being innocent). Everyone agrees that Eve should be shut down. The only person who can shut down Eve is Frank who is sitting in a special control room. Eve cannot hurt him, he has access to everything Eve can see, but he needs a password to shut down Eve. A small number of people, say 100 Londoners, know the password. Eve or Frank have no clue who they are, only that they exist. If one of them simply says the password, Eve will execute the person. So how can they reveal the password, without any of them getting killed?
It would be wise to imagine and realise that whatever and no matter how good Hacking Team are at what they do best, are there certainly others doing it equally well and even better and who would choose to remain unknown and relatively anonymous for every good reason that can be thought of. And one man's exploit with bugs is another man's APT ACT App and IntelAIgent Trojan/Astute HyperRadioProActive Vigilant Entity.

A sign of the times and a positive indication of the power of the Internet and free speech, webs and dark webs and spooky spaces, DB ......
And of course, it will only get better at an increasingly rapid and rabid effective rate.


Anonymous said...

Hi, constitutionally the Eve is fully illegitimate because of its violation of the First law of Robotics (-:

Frankly speaking, there must be a delay between the act of revealing password and the response of Eve. Presuming that Frank has the full See of the Eve, The 100 have to know where to paint it on the wall to be noticed by Frank immediately, letting him enter the password quickly and delay the execution :-)

Anonymous said...

Ah. Must all of them hundred hold a paint brush and paint it on the wall, the Eve will never be sure who of them was driving the brush. At least, everyone can keep 5%.

What? NO again? :-)

Just kidding.